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Overall Characteristics of the Treaty
Following the Peace of Münster (30 January 1648), Rome 
and Venice took steps to put an end to the hostilities in 
Portugal as well, and along the borders of Flanders, in 
Lorraine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. But in 1650 the ap-
proaches they made at the courts of Paris, Madrid and 
Brussels failed and the Anglo-French alliance was 
formed.1
The explanation for the 1659 Treaty lies first and fore-
most in the defeat of the Spanish by the Anglo-French 
army commanded by Turenne in 1658 at the Battle of the 
Dunes (Nieuwpoort, Flanders). Though peace had been 
restored along the Dutch front at Münster, the military 
conflict between the French Bourbons and the Hispanic 
Habsburgs continued along the Rhine and the Alps. As 
Núria Sales writes, “directly or indirectly, the Alps cast a 
much longer shadow over the Treaty of the Pyrenees than 
did the Pyrenees themselves”.2 
The Treaty’s final clauses reveal that international arbi-
tration was no longer exercised by any universal power on 
its own but by a more or less formal alliance of sovereign-
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An overall review of the 1659 Treaty between the Hispanic and French monarchies is undertaken. The European 
scope of the document is established in the light of its territorial clauses and articles on civil rights, commercial rela-
tions and troop withdrawals. While the Rhineland and Alpine front also comes in for attention, the main focus is on 
the Franco-Catalan Pyrenean front. The author notes that the Pyrenean range was the cradle of Catalonia, not a fron-
tier, and gives an account of how the new delimitation was traced. She also discusses Catalan resistance along the 
border (in Rosselló). Reference is made to the on-going wars between France and Spain after 1659, to the ill-defined 
nature of the new border, and to France’s offer to exchange Rosselló for the lands lying along its eastern frontier, in 
which it was primarily interested. This offer was never accepted. The dynastic, patrimonial and military origin and 
nature of European frontiers, which were established regardless of, and often in opposition to, the existence of peo-
ples, is stressed. 
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ties or powers brought together by one king or the other. 
The Pope and the Emperor are included on the side of the 
Catholic King, but all the archdukes of Austria are also 
mentioned, along with all the kings, princes, republics and 
states named in the Peace of Vervins, with the significant 
addition the United Provinces and the recently constituted 
(1621) Duchy of Guastalla. On the side of the Most Chris-
tian King the Treaty mentions the Duke of Savoy, the Duke 
of Modena, the Prince of Monaco, the Pope once more, 
and the electors and other princes of the Empire who were 
the allies of the King of France under the Peace of Mün-
ster3 (the Electors of Mainz and Cologne, the Count Pala-
tine of the Rhine, the Duke of Neubourg, the Dukes of 
Brunswick and Lunebourg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cas-
sel, the Landgrave of Darmstadt, the King of Sweden, the 
Doge and Signoria of Venice, and the thirteen Swiss can-
tons). The Peace Treaty was open to anyone who wished 
to be part of it, even minor sovereigns who applied to one 
of the two kings. Both monarchs must refrain from “im-
portuning or molesting, directly or through others” (“di-
recta ni indirectament molestar ni trabajar por si ni por 
otros”) and a certain commitment to resort to internation-
al law rather than military force is envisaged. If either king 
“has any claim” (“pretende alguna cosa”) against the allies 
of the other king, “he can only pursue it in law before the 
Competent Judges and on no account by the use of force” 
(“podrá solo seguirlo por derecho antre Juezes Compe-
tentes y no por fuerza de ninguna manera”).4
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The Distinctive Characteristics of 
Rosselló
In the wake of the military action taken by the Hispanic 
forces in August 1637 against the fortress of Leucata, 
which was considered the gate to Languedoc, the Pyrene-
an frontier became a factor throughout the rest of the 
war.12 The danger already arose at the talks in Münster — 
and was combated by the Catalan government institu-
tions — that the two crowns would sign a peace treaty di-
viding Catalonia in two by the force of arms or separating 
Rosselló from Catalonia. But after 1648 the fate of Catalo-
nia, like that of Flanders and Italy, still depended on the 
battle front and diplomacy.13 A memorandum from the 
French chief-of-staff, Bernard du Plessis-Besançon, stated 
in 1641 that “the conquest of Roussillon [is] the most sol-
id advantage the King could derive from the risings in 
Catalonia” (“le plus solide aventage que le roi puisse tirer 
des soulèvements de Catalogne [est] la conquête du Rous-
sillon”).14 Catalonia viewed Rosselló as its cradle; the Ca-
talan population considered it essential to their defence, a 
link with Europe, and of vital importance to the economy 
as an additional source of wheat, wool and leather. The 
Spaniards knew this full well. In 1629 the Madrid govern-
ment had weighed up the possibility of setting up a sepa-
rate Diputació15 in Perpinyà to compete with the one in 
Barcelona, thus taking advantage of the rivalry between 
the two cities. The Duke of Feria, the viceroy of Catalonia, 
wrote on that occasion: “it is desirable that vassals who 
cannot be curbed should not grow in number or wealth... 
[Rosellón] would be a great loss to them... because the 
province would decrease in size, Barcelona would have 
fewer people and less wealth... [and] trade between Barce-
lona and that kingdom [France] would be greatly ham-
pered” (“los vasallos que no se pueden refrenar es bien 
que no crezcan en número ni en substancia... [el Rosel-
lón] sería una gran pérdida para ellos... porque por este 
medio se reducía la província a ser menos extendida, a ser 
de menos gente y cantidad de hacienda Barcelona... se di-
ficultava mucho el comercio de Barcelona con aquel rey-
no [Francia]”). Moreover “their finances would be weak-
ened... and the jurisdiction of the deputies; and since 
wool, most of which comes from the counties [of Rosel-
lón], would become more expensive for them, the trade in 
cloth across the sea to Italy would decline, and all this 
province’s presumptuousness is based on this” (“se debil-
itava la hacienda... y la jurisdicción de los diputados; y por 
la lana que se les encarecía, por ser la mayor parte de ella 
de los condados, sería menos caudaloso el trato de los 
paños por la mar en Itàlia, que es en lo que consiste toda 
presunción de esta província”). Consequently, he felt, “no 
doubt it would be reduced to a better disposition than it 
shows today” (“sin duda se reduciría a mejor disposición, 
que la que hoy tiene”).16 It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that Louis XIV had the impression in 1656 that Madrid 
was not interested in the possession of Rosselló and wrote: 
“ It has always been taken for granted that the counties of 
The Peace Treaty drawn up by Don Luís Méndez de 
Haro y Guzmán and Cardinal Jules Mazarin, acting as 
plenipotentiaries, was published in various languages in 
1660, but no Latin original was produced: “when every-
thing was ready, each of us signed the two peace treaties 
in French and Spanish separately, at our respective tables” 
(“lorsque tout a esté prest, nous avons signé, chacun en 
particulier, sur nostre table, les deux traittez de paix, en 
français et en espagnol”).5,6 This may be seen as sympto-
matic of the decline of the papacy in European diploma-
cy.7 The compilers of diplomatic texts themselves tended 
to shun Latin: “Even the greatest treaties are not always 
published according to the original text. Thus the Treaty 
of Osnabrück and the League of the Rhine, which as eve-
ryone knows were drafted in Latin, were published only 
in French, in other words, in a more or less faithful trans-
lation, in Dumont’s Recueil, which is nonetheless consid-
ered authoritative, and rightly so”.8
All this shows that it would be a mistake to believe that 
the agreement contained in the Treaty to “cease all hostil-
ities by sea and land from 8 May that year” (“cessasión de 
todas hostilidades por mar y tierra, desde 8 de mayo de 
aquel año”)9 concerns only the area of the Pyrenees. 
The 1659 Peace between the Hispanic and French 
monarchies encompassed a large area of western Europe. 
The still very recent Treaties of Westphalia, signed in 
1648, have often led observers to assume that the Peace of 
1659 also had limited geographical scope but the fact is 
that certain aspects of the second treaty extended to the 
whole of Europe. It referred, not only to parts of the Pyr-
enees, but to parts of the Alps as well, and to the corridor 
between France and the Empire, which has always been in 
dispute and where defiant attitudes — as in the case of 
Flanders — are still found today. Moreover the 1659 
Treaty does not concern itself solely with territorially and/
or jurisdictionally defined political units, but to aspects of 
economic activity and trade as well. 
Despite all this, a view of the so-called Treaty of the 
Pyrenees has prospered which has little to do with its 
commercial provisions and pan-European character, as 
though it referred only to territorial matters and confined 
itself, furthermore, to the Catalan nation’s Pyrenean bas-
tion. 
The Treaty’s diplomatic name derives from the locality 
of Pheasant Island, in Lower Bidasoa, where the negotia-
tions were conducted by the two plenipotentiaries, Don 
Luís Méndez de Haro on the Hispanic side, and Cardinal 
Mazarin on the French side. It was here too that the Trea-
ty was signed (on 7 November 1659)10 and that Louis XIV 
and Philip IV listened as it was read out and swore on the 
gospels to abide by it (on 6 June 1660). The agreement 
was a prior step towards the marriage of Louis XIV to 
María Teresa of Austria, the daughter of Philip IV. The 
ceremony, which was a complementary outcome to the 
Treaty, took place at Donibane Lohizune (Saint Jean-de-
Luz) on 9 August.11
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encies and annexes, countries, towns, strongholds, castles, 
market towns, villages, vassals, subjects, woods and river 
banks. Article 42 lays the foundations for the demarca-
tion in terms that are ideological rather than historical: 
“With respect to the strongholds and countries on the 
Spanish side occupied in this war by French arms, it [has] 
been agreed in the negotiation which commenced in Ma-
drid in the year one thousand six hundred and fifty-six, 
upon which this treaty is based, that the Pyrenean moun-
tains, which have always been commonly regarded as the 
division between the Spains and the Gauls, should from 
now on also be the division between the respective king-
doms” (“Por lo que toca a las plazas y paises, que las armas 
de Francia han ocupado en esta guerra de la parte de Es-
paña, aviendose convenido en la negociación, que 
començó en Madrid el año de mil y seiscientos y cinquen-
ta y seis, sobre cuyo fundamento se va en este tratado, que 
los Montes Pirineos, que comunmente han sido siempre 
tenidos por división de las Españas y de las Galias, sean de 
aquí en adelante también la división de los mismos rey-
nos”). The counties of medieval Catalonia, however, had 
been born in the Pyrenees: to them the mountain chain 
had never been a frontier but a cradle. France, on the oth-
er hand — possibly because of the memory of the old 
kingdom of Majorca, or because these same counties had 
been pledged to Louis XI of France in 1462 by John II of 
Catalonia-Aragon in the wake of the war that monarch 
from the Trastámara dynasty had waged against Catalo-
nia — had always regarded this Catalan territory “as a 
‘theater of distractions’ from the main battlefields”24 or as 
an exchange token.25 The Pyrenean regions of Catalonia 
had suffered from the dangers inherent to their condition 
as a frontierland between the Hispanic and French mon-
archies since 1462, long before the rest of Catalonia did 
so. This helps to explain the disputes the arose and Per-
pinyà’s fantasies about Barcelona between 1620 and 
1630.26 The region’s status as a frontierland also explains 
why, in December 1639, a notary of Perpinyà, Pere Pas-
qual, warned his descendants in his diary that “whenever 
they heard the rumble of war, they must leave the town 
[Perpinyà] immediately for some very distant and isolat-
ed place, because of the very great vexations [which] sol-
diers commit against persons” (“sempre y quant hoian 
mormoll de guerra que se’n vayen al hora de la present 
vila [Perpinyà] y en part molt lluny y apartada, per rahó 
de las vexations tant grans [que] fan los soldats en las per-
sonas”) and why he repeated this advice in January 1640: 
“and so I tell and beg any descendant of mine that he 
should on no account live in this town [Perpinyà] but in 
some place far away from these troubles” (“y axí dich y 
prech a qualsevol descendent meu que no habite en nin-
guna manera en la present vila [Perpinyà] sinó en part 
apartada de aquestes inquietuts”).27 
Politically speaking the contents of Articles 42 and 43 
of the Treaty evince an attitude of great harshness towards 
the existence of Catalonia, a European people endowed 
with mature institutions dating back at least to the time of 
Roussillon would be ceded to me, for the ministers of 
Spain raised not the slightest difficulty in Münster.... 
whereas they would think twice about giving me satisfac-
tion over the kingdom of Navarre, which is withheld from 
me even more unjustly than Roussillon” (“il a toujours été 
presuposé que les comtés de Rousillon me demeureroi-
ent, que les ministres d’Espagne n’en firen pas la moindre 
difficulté a Münster … tandis que l’on feroit reflexion de 
me donner satisfaction sur le royaume de Navarre, que 
l’on me retient avec une injustice encore plus grande que 
celle qui regarde le Roussillon”).17
The Articles on Territorial Limits
As Robert Mandrou states, disagreeing with Gaston Zel-
ler, there was almost certainly no policy of “natural fron-
tiers” or methodical plan for achieving the famous regu-
larly-shaped French hexagon.18 And as Louis Batiffol 
explains in his prologue to the book by Vassal-Reig on the 
war in Rosselló under Louis XIII (1934), it was the 
Habsburg hegemony over Europe that worried Richelieu: 
“Richelieu always declared that the king’s constant preoc-
cupation must be to release himself from this strangle-
hold. This he must do using the means he [Richelieu] de-
scribes, notably in an advice dated 20 April 1628 and a 
note written in early 1629, in other words, by supporting 
everywhere, as allies, those who were at war with the 
House of Austria, whether they be princes or peoples. 
This was how he acted towards Holland, towards the 
protestant princes of the Empire, and towards Alsatia. 
And this was how he acted towards the rebel Portugal and 
the Catalans”.19 Richelieu had proposed to the Catalan 
representatives — who were received as the “ambassadors 
of a free province” — that they should become an inde-
pendent, sovereign republic. Batiffol considers that, on 
the face of it at least, this reflects his scruples and his in-
tention to reconcile the military aid requested by the re-
bellious Catalans with his desire, as a statesman, to do 
nothing that was not legally justified. Consequently the 
Pact of Péronne between Louis XIII and the Catalans (19 
September 1641) was conceived, not as an occupation but 
as a personal union between Catalonia and the King.20 In 
contrast, Mazarin’s realism, in Batiffol’s view, put an end 
to Richelieu’s legalistic prudence: his policy “was an open 
admission of his idea of endowing France with natural 
frontiers”.21 According to Peter Sahlins, in 17th century 
France “ideas about geography, history and strategy coex-
isted” and “the idea of the Rhine and the Pyrenees as 
France’s ideal limits thus came to occupy a central place 
in the political culture of seventeenth-century France”.22
But to return to the Treaty of the Pyrenees, it consists 
of 124 articles, of which numbers 42 and 43 refer specifi-
cally to the Catalan territories that were to be separated 
from the rest. It names them as the county of Roussillon/
Rosellón, the Magistracy of Conflent and part of the 
County of Cerdagne / Cerdaña,23 along with their depend-
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gitimate the incorporation of Catalan territories into the 
Crown of France “notwithstanding any laws, customs, 
statutes, constitutions and conventions adopted to the 
contrary, even if they were ratified by oath... (and) to the 
exclusion in perpetuum of all exceptions, on whatever 
right, title, cause or pretext they may be founded, and spe-
cifically any exception which might seek or claim in the 
future that the separation... might be contrary to the Con-
stitutions of the Principality of Catalonia, and that for that 
reason the separation could not be decided or agreed 
upon without the express consent of all the peoples as-
sembled in the States General” (“no obstante qualesquier 
leyes, costumbres, estatutos, constituciones y conven-
ciones hechas en contrario, aunque ayan sido confirma-
das por juramento” “y excluyendo a perpètuo todas las 
excepciones debaxo de qualquier derecho, título o causa o 
pretexto que puedan estar fundadas y nominatamente 
aquella que se quisiesse o pudiesse pretender en adelante 
que la separación... fuesse contra Constituciones del Prin-
cipado de Cataluña, y que por esso dicha separación no ha 
podido ser resuelta ni acordada sin el consentimiento ex-
presso de todos los pueblos congregados en Estados Gen-
erales”). The text also released from their oath of alle-
giance those who had previously been men, vassals and 
subjects of the Hispanic monarchy, without taking into 
account the territorial integrity or parliamentary unity of 
Catalonia.29
The watertight wording of Article 43 should not sur-
prise us. Whoever helped draft the text was thoroughly 
familiar with the Catalan political system and wanted to 
forestall any constitutional challenge or subsequent po-
litical rebellion. Throughout the month of June 1659 the 
Catalan government, aware that preliminary discussions 
between the two crowns were underway in Paris, had 
made approaches to the Catholic King to prevent the divi-
sion. “It has been said,” observed Jaume Copons, the 
archdeacon of Andorra, “that the county of Rosselló will 
be separated from this Principality, and put under alle-
giance to France, and this would be very harmful and 
prejudicial to the Principality” (“s’ha dit que lo comtat del 
Rosselló se separaria del present Principat, restant baix 
obediència de Fransa, lo que seria grandíssim dany y prej-
udici d’aquest Principat”). And the Generalitat stated, in a 
letter to Philip IV, that “It causes us great anxiety to think 
that the King of France is unwilling to forego the occupa-
tion of the counties of Rosselló and Cerdanya” (“Dónans 
molt gran cuidado lo pensar que per part del rey de Fransa 
no vulla restarse ab la ocupació dels comtats de Rosselló y 
Cerdanya”) and reminded him that Peter ‘the Ceremoni-
ous’ had united them “to your royal Crown” (“a sa real 
Corona”) and bestowed “the privilege of perpetual union” 
(“privilegi d’unió perpètua”). Nor did the Catalan govern-
ment fail to mention the strategic value of the counties, 
which constituted “a rampart against the kingdom of 
France” (“muralla contra lo regne de Fransa”), for with-
out them “the Principality [would be left] unprotected 
and the path would be open to any invasion the French-
Peter ‘the Ceremonious’ (1336-1387). The Treaty cate-
gorically annexes to France “the whole County and Mag-
istracy of Roussillon/Rosellón and... the County and Mag-
istracy of Conflans/Conflent” (“todo el Condado Vegueria 
de Rosellón y... Condado y Vegueria de Conflent”) and 
goes on to say: “Naturally if there were any places in the 
aforementioned County and Magistracy of Conflans/
Conflent only, not that of Roussillon/Rosellón, which lie 
in the said Pyrenean mountains on the Spanish side, they 
must remain to his Catholic Majesty, and in the same way, 
if there were any places in the aforementioned County 
and Magistracy of Cerdagne/Cerdaña only, and not in 
Catalonia, which lie in the said mountains on the French 
side, they must remain to his Most Christian Majesty. 
And to agree on the said division, Commissaries shall be 
appointed on both sides who, together and in good faith, 
shall declare which Pyrenean mountains, in execution of 
the contents of this article, must divide the two kingdoms 
in the future” (“Bien entendido, que si se hallaren algunos 
lugares del dicho Condado y Vegueria de Conflent sola-
mente, y no de Rosellón, que esten dentro de dichos Mon-
tes Pirineos a la parte de España, quedaran a su Magestad 
Cathólica, como también si se hallaren algunos lugares 
del dicho Condado y Vegueria de Cerdania solamente, y 
no de Cataluña, que esten dentro de dichos Montes a la 
parte de Francia, quedaran a su Magestad Christianíssi-
ma. Y para convenir de dicha división, seran luego diputa-
dos Comissarios de una parte y otra, los quales juntos de 
buena fee declararan quales son los Montes Pirineos que, 
en execución de lo contenido en este artículo deben di-
vidir en lo venidero los dos Reynos”). The contents of the 
text reveal that the royal diplomats had a considerably 
more feudalizing, non-integrated view of the territory 
than the Catalans. Neither the historian Andreu Bosch, 
despite his pro-Rosselló stance, nor of course the govern-
ment of Catalonia (the Diputació del General) could have 
accepted anything of the kind, because for all of them the 
counties were first and foremost magistracies of Catalan 
territory.
The severity of the diplomatic text lies in its irrevocable 
nature, in the way it acknowledges the Most Christian 
King’s definitive right of succession and legitimates the 
Hispanic monarchs’ violation of territorial constitution-
alism and their oaths. “Under the irrevocable peace trea-
ty” (“Por el tratado de paz irrevocable”) the Hispanic 
monarch renounces Catalan territory north of the Al-
beres28 “in perpetuum and for ever in favour and to the 
benefit of the aforenamed lord, the Most Christian King” 
(“a perpètuo y para siempre a favor y a provecho de dicho 
señor rey Christianíssimo”). The Catholic King surren-
ders it “in his own name, that of his heirs, and legal suc-
cessors” (“tanto por si, como por sus herederos, y por los 
que tuvieren su derecho”) to the King of France and “his 
heirs, and legal successors” (“sus herederos, successores y 
de los que tuvieren sus derechos”). The text seeks to legiti-
mate these successoral rights almost as though they were 
dynastic patrimonial rights. What is more, it seeks to le-
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Strabo, Pliny and Ptolemy, but also his historical knowl-
edge of the Carolingian counties. In the course of the War 
of the Reapers, the learned archbishop Pèire de Marca had 
been sent to Catalonia as a visiteur (1644-1651). He took 
possession of the documents of monastic origin collected 
by the Catalan historian Jeroni Pujades and used them in 
his Marca Hispanica to seek evidence in support of the 
territorial ambitions of Louis XIV.35 Now Rosselló was no 
longer a topic of discussion and the debate focused on 
Conflent and Cerdanya. Marca used the word ancienne-
ment to defend frontiers based on the classical Roman in-
terpretation, which claimed that the dividing line was 
marked by some lost trophy of Pompey’s or a temple to 
Venus: “olim trophaea Pompeii in summo Pyrenaeo posi-
ta quae, ut docet Stabo, Hispaniam et Galliam distermi-
nabant, ubi sunt fauces quae Hispanias Galliis jungunt, ut 
T. Livii verbis utamur” (“at that time, Pompey’s trophies, 
[were] placed on the summit of the Pyrenees which, ac-
cording to Strabo, divided Hispania from Gaul, and 
where, to quote T. Livy, the pass that joins the Spains to 
the Gauls is located”) and “illos porro diserte et constan-
ter docere promontorium montium Pyrenaeorum, in cu-
jus vertice positum erat templum Veneris, Aphrodisium 
dictum graecus, esse verum limitem Galliarum et Hispan-
iarum” (“in olden times they were taught, in precise, un-
varying terms, that the promontory of the Pyrenean 
range, on the top of which stands the temple to Venus, 
known in Greek as Aphrodite, was the true boundary be-
tween the Gauls and the Spains.”). Marca’s historical ar-
guments dated back to the high Middle Ages. Any geo-
graphical argument that failed to confirm his reasoning 
he rejected. Consequently he ignored Mount Canigó and 
the Corberes as part of the Pyrenees and rejected the en-
tire history of Catalonia after the initial period of its divi-
sion into counties. The French commissaries, Marca and 
Serroni, considered that their conception of the mountain 
range, based on theory and on Roman sources rather than 
on reality and geography, was beyond dispute. In their 
opinion it was sufficient to insist that “qui fuerint olim 
limites Galliae Narbonensis et Hispaniae Tarraconensis 
in ea Pyrenaeorum montium parte” (“the boundary be-
tween Narbonnese Gaul and Tarraconensis [Hispania 
Citerior] was formerly in this part of the Pyrenean range”). 
Their historical arguments enabled the French commis-
saries to make still more ambitious claims: they could de-
mand anything from La Seu d’Urgell — on the grounds 
that it belonged to the ancient county of Cerdanya — to 
the whole of Catalonia. In March 1660 Serroni wrote to 
Mazarin from Ceret: “… we discussed the division be-
tween the Gauls and the Spains, which are ancient terms, 
and not the division between France and Spain, which are 
the terms that are used nowadays…” and “… at present 
we are searching for Gauls and Spains and not for the 
domination or jurisdiction which one King or the other 
may have had there. Otherwise we would be entirely 
founded in claiming the whole of Catalonia and going to 
pitch our tents on the banks of the Ebro” (“… on parlait 
man might wish to undertake” (“desabrigat lo Principat y 
uberts los passos pera qualsevol invasió vulla fer lo 
francès”).30 The Council of Aragon had also opposed the 
partition of Catalan territory. This explains why Haro ex-
pressed fear during the talks lest the Council should ob-
ject to the negotiations.31 According to Mazarin, Luís de 
Haro was not very dynamic (“he advances very slowly” — 
“va muy despacio”) and was somewhat ill-prepared (“he 
lacks thorough information about foreign affairs” — “Il 
n’est pas informé a fond des affaires êtrangeres”). It should 
be remembered, however, that Haro was trapped between 
decisions already taken at the court in Madrid and the ob-
jections being raised by the powerless Council of 
Aragon.32
Articles 49, 116 and 118 established that various strong-
holds and ports in Catalan territory which were still in 
French hands should be returned to the Catholic King, 
but proposed postponing the restitution of Cadaqués, 
Roses and the fort of La Trinitat until definitive frontiers 
had been negotiated.33 
The Work of the Commissaries in Ceret, 
Figueras i Llívia 
It required special meetings between the commissaries on 
both sides to solve the problem of the delimitation in pre-
cise territorial terms. The commissaries on the French 
side were Pèire de Marca, the archbishop of Toulouse, 
and Hyacinthe Serroni, the bishop of Orange. On the His-
panic side they were Miquel Salvà de Vallgornera, a knight 
of the Order of Saint James, royal counsellor and lieuten-
ant of the Mestre Racional (the court accountant and au-
ditor) and Josep Romeu de Ferrer, a magistrate of the 
Catalan Royal Court of Justice. Though both the latter 
were Catalans, they acted as representatives of the Catho-
lic King, and definitely not on behalf of Catalonia or the 
Council of Aragon. 
Contemporary geographers lacked accurate knowledge 
of the Pyrenees. As the 17th century historian from Ros-
selló Andreu Bosch points out, some considered the mas-
sifs of Montseny, Sant Llorenç, Montserrat and Montsec 
as “branches, offshoots and arms of the Pyrenees” 
(“branques, rams y brasos dels Pyrineus”).34 Article 42, 
which defined the Pyrenees as the dividing line, also raised 
other problems of interpretation. While the French ver-
sion of the Treaty said that the Pyrenees “in olden times 
divided the Gauls from the Spains” (“avoient ancienne-
ment divisé les Gaules des Espagnes”), the Spanish ver-
sion spoke of the “Pyrenean mountains, which have al-
ways commonly been regarded as the division between 
the Spains and the Gauls” (“montes Pirineos que común-
mente han sido siempre tenidos por división de las Es-
pañas y de las Galias”). The words anciennement (in olden 
times) and comúnmente (commonly) were basic to the 
discussions. Underlying the word anciennement was all 
Pèire de Marca’s geographical knowledge, drawn from 
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lowed in the complicated process of returning patrimo-
nies and property confiscated in the course of the military 
conflict, in fulfilment of the provisions for restitutions 
and compensations under civil law.42
As Núria Sales points out, though the frontiers between 
the old Pyrenean counties and the ongoing Franco-His-
panic wars preclude any definitive view, the Treaty was in 
effect a “mere Seven Years’ Truce”.43 It should be borne in 
mind nevertheless that the two monarchies acted outside 
the Catalan parliamentary system with the intention of 
making the agreements watertight and, if possible, per-
manent, and of preventing the Catalan institutions from 
being represented.44 Thus the Catalan constitucions (laws) 
were forcibly excluded from public territorial law.
It emerges clearly from the Treaty that the wide institu-
tional diversity of each monarchy’s territory was taken 
into account: in other words, neither the territory called 
Spain nor the territory called France corresponds to any 
political unit aside from the monarchy itself. Not only 
were the frontiers yet to the drawn, but the territories of 
both crowns were yet to be integrated. This explains why 
the Treaty, when referring to the subjects of the Catholic 
King, talks about “towns, subjects, merchants, residents 
and inhabitants of the kingdoms, states, provinces and 
countries belonging to his lordship the Catholic King” 
(“villas, subditos, mercaderes, estantes y habitantes de los 
reynos, estados, provincias y paises pertenencientes al 
señor rey cathólico”) and why it also alludes to the “sub-
jects of his lordship the aforesaid Most Christian King, of 
whatever country or nation they may be” (“subditos del 
dicho señor rey christianíssimo de qualquier país o nación 
que sean”). The notions of ‘Spaniard’ and ‘Frenchman’ 
relate to their status as subjects of a particular monarchy, 
and certainly not to any national territory. 
The Rhineland and Alpine Fronts
If we now turn from the Catalan front to the front that ran 
along the King of France’s eastern border, we see that the 
Treaty also served to reorganize European territories 
stretching roughly from the North Sea to the Alps which 
were perpetually under dispute.45 The French crown ob-
tained lands in the county of Artois and strongholds in 
the counties of Flanders and Hainaut and the duchy of 
Luxembourg; and it was stipulated that lands between the 
Sambre and the Meuse were to be interchanged or re-
turned, and that no place was to be fortified in such a way 
as to prevent or hinder communications with France. The 
Most Christian King returned the Po and the county of 
Burgundy to the Catholic King. This was to be done with-
out demolitions or damage; munitions, artillery and mili-
tary supplies could be removed; and officers and soldiers 
were entitled to take their belongings with them, but must 
not leave debts or steal anything. Louis XIV agreed that 
when he recovered the stronghold of Hesdin and its baili-
wick, he would grant an official pardon to the garrison, 
de la division dels Gaules et des Espagnes, qui sont des 
anciens termes, et non pas de la division de la France et de 
l’Espagne, qui sont les termes dont on se sert présente-
ment…”; “… on cherche présentement des Gaules et des 
Espagnes et non pas de la domination ou jurisdiction que 
l’un ou l’autre Roy y peuvent avoir eu. Autrement nous 
pourrions prétendre avec grand fondement toute la Cata-
logne et aller planter nos tentes sur les bords de l’Ebre”).36
The Catalan commissaries of the Catholic King, Salvà 
de Vallgornera and Romeu de Ferrer, were less learned 
but had a better command of real geographical, historical 
and legal knowledge acquired in the field. Contrary to 
what has sometimes been said, the arguments they put 
forward — according to which the whole Magistracy of 
Conflent, along with Capcir and the whole county of Cer-
danya, should remain under the rule of the Hispanic 
monarch — were not inferior but different.37
No agreement was reached in Ceret (22 March-13 April 
1660); in fact only the separation of Rosselló was approved 
and the talks resumed in Figueres (at the end of April). 
The discussions over the frontier were delaying the royal 
marriage.38 A new meeting was held in haste, this time in 
Llívia and without Marca. With only Serroni present, the 
separation of Conflent was confirmed and it was agreed 
that Cerdanya should be split in two. Rosselló and Con-
flent were adjudicated to the King of France, except for 
any places that might lie on the southern slope of the Pyr-
enees (no such places existed) and Cerdanya was adjudi-
cated to the Hispanic King, except for any places lying on 
the northern slope of the Pyrenees (these included Planes, 
Sant Pere dels Forcats, La Perxa, Ruet and Llo).39
Under this agreement (12 November), the enclave of 
Llívia was left in Hispanic hands but the valley of Cerdan-
ya was irrationally divided in two. Other flagrant abnor-
malities were approved, among them the case of Ix and its 
borough: “this division [does not seek] to separate the 
said territory from the aforementioned village of Ix with 
regard to the domain, property, crops, pastures, or any-
thing else belonging to it, and this separation [is to be un-
derstood] only as regarding Spain and France and not the 
private domain or property of the territory, which will al-
ways remain united to the said village of Ix” (“no preten-
diendo por esta división separar el dicho territorio del di-
cho villaje de Ix en lo que toca al dominio, propiedad, 
frutos, pastos, ni otra qualquier cosa a él perteneciente, no 
debiendo entenderse esta separación sinó España y Fran-
cia y no del dominio o propiedad particular del dicho ter-
ritorio, que quedará siempre unido al dicho villaje de 
Ix”).40 While solutions of this type were being found for 
Cerdanya, on the Coll de Panissars in the Alberes, be-
tween Vallespir and Alt Empordà, a monastery was split 
down the middle: the church, which was left on the French 
king’s side of the border, was demolished and the stone 
used to build the castle of Bellaguarda, while the monastic 
quarters remained on the Hispanic king’s side.41
On 28 April 1660, prior to the meetings in Llívia, the 
same commissaries had approved the method to be fol-
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Condé was to hand over the strongholds of Rocroi, Châte-
let and Linchamps to the Most Christian King, and recov-
ered in compensation all his titles and estates, subject to 
certain exchanges. His son, the Duke d’Enghien, was to be 
appointed Grand Maistre de France.51 In compensation 
for the agreement between Condé and the King of France, 
the Catholic King was to return the castle of Juliers, which 
belonged to the House of Cleves, to the Duke of Neuburg, 
though he retained a right of way for his troops.52
Finally the plenipotentiaries confirmed the validity of 
the 1598 Treaty of Vervins and reasserted the rights of the 
Most Christian King as King of France and Navarre.53
Ten articles were devoted to the Italian hornets’ nest. 
The Dukes of Savoy, Modena and Mantua were included 
in the Treaty.54 All were involved in the war, for geograph-
ical reasons, and all were involved in unresolved conflicts 
of their own, notably the Duke of Savoy, an ally of the 
King of France. Now they were also to take part in the res-
titutions, their subjects were to be guaranteed rights of 
navigation and trade, a solution was to be found to certain 
unfulfilled commitments with regard to dowries, and es-
tablished territorial agreements were to be upheld. The 
castle of Vercelli and Cencio in the Langhe were to be re-
turned to the Duke of Savoy. The Catholic King under-
took to obtain legal clarification about the dowry of the 
deceased Catherine of Savoy — 48,000 ducats a year to be 
raised from the Foggia customs house in the kingdom of 
Naples — and settle any arrears. This dowry was the ob-
ject of a dispute between Savoy and Modena. The amount 
corresponding to the years during which the House of 
Modena was at war with the Hispanic duchy of Milan 
were excluded from the dowry, however. The Catholic 
King accepted the submission of the Duke of Modena, 
promised him the stronghold of Correggio, which was to 
remain free of his garrison, and undertook to ask the Em-
peror to acknowledge his investiture. He warned the Duke 
to remain neutral between the two crowns. Philip IV 
agreed not to support any Italian prince who might seek 
to infringe the so-called status quo of Cherasco (1631) re-
garding the dispute between Savoy, Mantua and other 
seigneuries. The Treaty also refers to a dispute over an-
other dowry — that of Margaret of Savoy, the grandmoth-
er of the Duke of Mantua — which was to be settled before 
the spring. In the clauses relating to Italy the two mon-
archs agreed to call on the Pope to put an end to the con-
flict between the Duke of Modena and the Apostolic 
Chamber over the Valli di Comacchio and to give the 
Duke of Parma time to pay off his debt to the Chamber by 
pledging or alienating part of his estates. The aim was to 
obtain a commitment from the Pope to “uproot the seeds 
of all the disputes that might disturb the repose of Italy” 
(“arrancar la simiente de todas las diferencias que podrian 
turbar el reposo de Italia”) in accordance with his desire 
“to prevent all occasions of discord in Christendom..., a 
cause which is so dear to the Apostolic See” (“prevenir to-
das las ocasiones de discòrdia en la Cristiandad... una 
causa tan benemérita de la Sede Apostólica”). 
which had gone over to the Catholic King in the course of 
the conflict. The Catholic King, for his part, surrendered 
any right to Alsatia and agreed that it was to become part 
of the French Crown, in accordance with the specifica-
tions of the Treaty of Münster, signed on 24 October 
1648.46 To bring the new demarcations into effect and im-
plement the unfulfilled provisions of earlier treaties (Cat-
eau-Cambrésis, 1559, and Vervins, 1598), it was also de-
cided to appoint commissaries for the Low Countries and 
to resort to arbitration in case of disagreement.47 Here, as 
in Catalonia, the acquisition of new territories brought 
with it the corresponding rights of sovereignty and eccle-
siastical patronage, which were to be “for ever united and 
incorporated... notwithstanding any laws, customs and 
statutes and agreements that may have been enacted to 
the contrary” (“para siempre unidos y incorporados... no 
obstante qualquiera leyes, costumbres y estatutos y con-
venciones hechas en contrario”).48 The King of France 
had three months from the signature of the Treaty to ne-
gotiate a peace settlement with Portugal. He had to guar-
antee a general pardon for the Portuguese and a return to 
the situation that existed prior to 1640. Whatever the out-
come of the negotiations, France undertook “not to give 
the aforesaid Kingdom of Portugal... any assistance, or 
public or secret help, directly or indirectly...” (“no dar al 
dicho Reyno de Portugal... ninguna assistencia, ni ayuda 
pública ni secreta, directa ni indirectamente...”).49 
The Treaty reveals that financial compensation was 
also to be made. Three million livres tournoises, for in-
stance, were to be paid to the Archdukes of Innsbrück in 
exchange for the rights to Alsatia, while the Duke of Lor-
raine was to pay an unspecified sum of money and agree 
to cede territories to the French crown, including the dio-
ceses of Metz, Toul and Verdun, the duchy of Bar and the 
county of Clermont. All this was to compensate for the 
recovery of his now smaller duchy. Charles IV of Lorraine 
was reminded that his duchy had been conquered by Louis 
XIII’s army, and in order to neutralize his power he was 
required to demobilize and disarm before recovering it. 
The saltworks in Lorraine remained under the obligation 
to supply salt to France, and the duchy had to grant right 
of way and billets to French troops on their way to Alsatia. 
Finally a series of clauses regulate the procedure to be fol-
lowed by the Most Christian King and the Duke in mat-
ters arising out of the provisions and confiscations, and 
the judgments handed down in the course of the war. 
With regard to the duchy of Lorraine, the Catholic King 
had to urge the Emperor to ratify “all the Articles agreed 
in the present Treaty by notarial act in identical form 
(which will be delivered to His Most Christian Majesty)” 
(“por auto en forma auténtica [el qual será entregado a su 
Magestad Christianíssima] todos los Artículos que se ha 
convenido en el presente Tratado”). Besides the submis-
sion of the Duke of Lorraine,50 the Treaty provided for the 
return to allegiance of Condé, a member of the Fronde, 
who was a prince of royal blood from the Bourbon-
Vendôme branch and a potential ally of the Catholic King. 
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blocked by ice” (“puedan passar los Montes antes que los 
yelos embaracen el passo”). The Treaty laid down the 
rules for the payment of rations and other expenses to do 
with prisoners of war. The terms of reference were pro-
vided by the procedures followed “in the year one thou-
sand six hundred and forty-six, which were established in 
Soissons, when the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo was gov-
erning the Low Countries” (“del año de mil y seiscientos y 
quarenta y seis, que se hizo en Suesons, governando los 
Paises Baxos el marqués de Castel-Rodrigo”). Commis-
saries on both sides were to meet in some place in Flan-
ders yet to be specified with the accountants of the king-
doms of Naples and Sicily, Milan, Piedmont, “the 
Principality of Catalonia and the counties of Roussillon/
Rosellón and Cerdagne/Cerdaña” (“Principado de Cat-
aluña y condados de Rossellón y Cerdaña”) and the bor-
derland between France and the Low Countries. There 
they were to calculate the expenditure and determine 
which king was in debt to the other. The debtor under-
took to settle outstanding amounts “for the expenses and 
rations of the said prisoners of war” (“por los gastos y ra-
ciones de los dichos prisioneros de guerra”) in cash.58
The Treaty of the Pyrenees, like that of Vervins, was to 
be ratified by registering it in the Catholic King’s Coun-
cils and Chambers of Accounts in the Low Countries, the 
kingdom of Castile and the kingdom of Aragon, and in 
the Parliaments and Chambers of Accounts in Paris and 
the other Parliaments in the kingdom of France.59 The 
plenipotentiaries undertook to ensure that the terms of 
the Treaty would be ratified and sworn by both monarchs 
in the presence of accredited witnesses.60
The text is rife with the diplomatic dissimulation of the 
period. This can be seen from the copy of the powers giv-
en by both kings at the end of the Treaty to their respec-
tive plenipotentiaries. Neither King, it claims, wanted 
war, but both went to war because of “the hidden will of 
God” (“ocultos juicios divinos”) or “the will known only 
to Divine Providence” (“juicios reservados a la Providen-
cia Divina”). It was also the hand of God that made it pos-
sible for peace to be sealed. Now the Catholic King wanted 
“the vassals of both Crowns [to begin] to enjoy the rest 
they so badly need and have deserved during the toil and 
calamities of a very long and burdensome war and [to 
feel] mutual love and affection as they used to, seeking 
comfort from each other and their common welfare” 
(“que los vassallos de ambas Coronas comiencen a gozar 
el descanso que tanto necessitan y han merecido en los 
trabajos y calamidades de tan larga y pesada guerra y que 
buelvan a amarse y corresponderse como solian entre si 
buscando el alivio unos de otros y el mayor bien de to-
dos”). The Most Christian King exculpated himself by in-
voking his wish to conclude “a war we found burning 
when we succeeded to the Crown” (“una guerra que en 
nuestra sucsessión a la Corona hallamos encendida”) and 
“to give peace to the peoples who owe us allegiance and at 
the same time to cause Christendom to enjoy the repose it 
so sorely needs” (“dar la paz a los pueblos que estan sum-
Both crowns concealed their warlike attitude by claim-
ing that divine inspiration had led them to play the role of 
pacifiers desirous of “giving rest to their peoples” (“dar el 
reposo a sus pueblos”), not only in Italy, through the ap-
peal to the Pope, but in the Empire as well. Here they ex-
pressed concern over “the present state of Germany and 
the other Northern Countries where war is raging and 
where it may also break out in the Empire owing to the 
divisions between its Princes and States” (“el estado en 
que estan la Alemania y demás Paises del Norte donde la 
guerra se halla encendida y que también puede encend-
erse en el Imperio por la divisiones de sus Príncipes y Es-
tados”). In other words, despite the Treaty of Westphalia 
“the disputes that can disturb the repose of the Empire” 
(“las diferencias que pueden turbar el reposo del Imper-
io”) were still alive.55 The preventive action to be taken by 
the two crowns also extended to the Swiss cantons where, 
despite the resolution of religious discord between “Cath-
olics and Protestants.... a few sparks still remain beneath 
the ashes [which] give rise to disagreement and division 
within the said nation” (“cathólicos y protestantes... 
quedan debaxo de la ceniza algunas centellas... que oca-
sionan la mala inteligencia entre la dicha nación”). Their 
action included the Grisons as well, an area affected by 
the Franco-Hispanic dispute over the Valtellina. Here the 
two crowns undertook to reach amicable agreements once 
the Grisons had accepted the Treaty. Unrest in Italy had 
had repercussions on Monaco too. The war in the king-
dom of Naples and the duchy of Milan had driven the 
principality to put itself under French protection and the 
Catholic King now returned his domains to the Prince of 
Monaco. Philip IV was also to indemnify the Duchess de 
Chevreuse with the sum of 165,000 livres tournoises for 
the lands and seigneuries of Kerpein and Lommersein, 
which she had bought from him and he had subsequently 
adjudicated to the Bishop Elector of Cologne.56
The Treaty stipulated the dates at which these restitu-
tions and exchanges were to take place and how they were 
to be carried out. Each monarch was to delegate a minis-
ter to represent him at the other court. If objections or 
claims arose over the restitutions, these ministers were to 
act as a tribunal, with no appeal from their decisions.57
Clauses Governing the Disbanding of 
Troops
The overall European scope of the clauses referring to 
princes, territories and peoples emerges with equal, or 
greater, clarity from the provisions concerning the release 
without ransom of prisoners of war. These clauses applied 
to prisoners “of whatever nation and condition they might 
be” (“de qualquiera nacion y condición que sean”), in-
cluding galley slaves and French soldiers held captive in 
Hispanic strongholds on the African coast. The return of 
prisoners in Italy was to be hastened so that “they could 
cross the Mountains [Alps] before the passes [were] 
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nomic logic of their own. The Treaty of the Pyrenees 
opened the door to French commercial competition in 
Hispanic Catalonia and tended to criminalize the eco-
nomic relations between Catalans on either side of the 
new frontier and consider them as contraband. 
A Short-Lived Peace, a Perpetual War, and 
an Uncertain Frontier
The opening articles of the Peace Treaty contain an as-
sortment of considerations about the need for a lasting 
peace. The true reasons for the Treaty are concealed, how-
ever, and there is no mention of factors to do with finance 
or military inadequacy. The suspension of hostilities de-
creed on 8 May 1659 is explained in diplomatic language 
that resorts to moral rhetoric: the aim was to stop “the 
long and bloody war” (“la larga y sangrienta guerra”), to 
put “an end to countless misfortunes” (“fin a tantos infor-
tunios”) which have “afflicted peoples, kingdoms, states 
and countries” (“afligido los pueblos, reynos, estados y 
paises”) and “given rise to distress, suffering, poverty, ca-
lamities and desolation” (“han resultado males, miserias, 
calamidades y desolación”), and to permit peoples “eve-
rywhere to repair the damage and misfortune endured” 
(“puedan reparar en todas partes los daños y miserias pa-
decidas”).66
The end of the war, however, did not arouse much en-
thusiasm: “the people were not very happy” (“la gent no 
n’estava molt alegra”), wrote Miquel Parets in his con-
temporary diary, referring to the people of Barcelona, 
decimated by the plague. For the Catalans the war had 
ended in total defeat. Official news of the signing of the 
Treaty did not reach Barcelona until mid-February and 
the Catalan government lamented the late arrival of the 
information (and no doubt other things besides): “[the 
delay] surprises us not a little since, in the light of the re-
quirements of our posts, we consider ourselves the most 
directly concerned in knowing how the Treaty affects the 
Principality” (“del que fem no poca admiració, per con-
siderarnos los més interessats per l’obligació de nostres 
càrrechs en saber com resta est Principat en lo tractat de 
pau”).67 Once diplomatic silence had been lifted, the text 
of the Treaty was widely distributed. “Very many copies 
were printed,” wrote Parets, “so that they could be sent all 
over Catalonia and private individuals could buy them to 
find out what type of agreements had been reached and 
how they affected the different provinces” (“ne estam-
paren moltísimes, per enviar-ne per tota Catalunya y per 
a que los particulars ne comprasen, per a saber lo modo 
dels pactes y del modo que restaven unes provínties y al-
tres.”).68
The borders defined under of the Treaty of the Pyr-
enees might have been altered by the new series of wars 
between the two crowns that took place in the second half 
of the 17th century, for the hostilities continued, despite 
the peace rhetoric of the preliminaries to the 1659 Treaty 
issos a nuestra obediencia y juntamente hacer gozar a la 
Christiandad el reposo que tanto necessita”).
Civil Rights, Commercial and Consular 
Relations
A whole series of articles are devoted to guaranteeing the 
liberties and civil rights of the Catalans on either side of 
the new frontier, including those relating to inheritances, 
testaments and donations between living persons. Those 
who live on opposite sides of the border are guaranteed 
the right to receive income, providing this is done through 
procurators who are above suspicion, and the right to re-
ceive justice in the case of lawsuits. The articles deal with 
the restitution of confiscated patrimonies and revenues 
and the way this is to be done. All these provisions also 
apply to seigneuries and ecclesiastical benefices.61 
The Peace includes another series of articles on free-
dom of trade and navigation, the prohibition of reprisals, 
and the guarantee of linguistic and legal rights for mer-
chants, subject always to the payment of the appropriate 
taxes. Commercial reciprocity is established between the 
subjects of the two monarchies, in line with the policy 
pursued by France —according to the Treaty— with Eng-
land and Holland. The establishment of consulates and 
the recognition of embassies is recommended.62 But there 
are also restrictions of course. The subjects of both kings 
are prohibited from trading with countries that are at war 
with either of them or with enemy ships. Inevitably spe-
cific reference is made to Portugal.63 Trading with the 
king’s enemy and trading in military supplies are clearly 
defined as contraband. A series of articles referring to ob-
ligatory passports, the issuance of maritime passports, 
and admiralty courts are designed to prevent and penalize 
smuggling.64 Though the Treaty specifies that if any new 
conflict should break out, six months’ leeway will be al-
lowed so that subjects of either crown can remove them-
selves and their possessions to safety,65 the fact is that both 
the Peace and the frontiers were so fragile that the vassals’ 
customary trading activities were often criminalized. It 
can be observed that the term ‘Spaniards’ is used to refer 
to the subjects of the monarchy and in no case to the na-
tives of a particular country, kingdom or principality. 
Thus the wars waged by the king could make trade be-
tween Catalonia and Languedoc a crime, while the free-
dom of trade that was in the interest of the monarchies 
could undermine Catalan law in times of shortage by per-
mitting the unrestricted circulation of wheat. It is clear 
that the articles on the free circulation of merchandise be-
tween monarchies ignore existing commercial systems in 
the different countries and nations that are part of these 
monarchies. The requirements of free trade and the no-
tion of contraband, as defined in the light of royal military 
and fiscal policies, could — and indeed did, both south 
and north of the Alberes — distort socio-economic rela-
tions between nations with a historical and socio-eco-
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are to return Roussillon and the county of Cerdagne to 
the Spaniards along with everything I acquired beyond 
the Mountains under the Treaty of the Pyrenees, adding a 
few pieces over towards Navarre which might suit them, 
and to give in addition considerable sums of money, pay-
able every year over a period”.72 News of the unofficial 
and supposedly secret negotiations spread all over Europe 
and was related to a number of episodes of resistance that 
broke out in Rosselló (1670-1675). In the autumn of 1677 
one last exchange was turned down by Don Juan José de 
Austria. France offered him the Catalan lands in the east-
ern Pyrenees and the Sicilian strongholds which the latest 
wars had left in French hands in exchange for the Low 
Countries and Franche-Comté. Alsatia too was to be re-
turned to the Emperor, while Lorraine, which had been 
occupied again since 1670, would be returned to its duke, 
and Don Juan José himself would receive 4 million livres 
tournoises.
Peter Sahlins writes: “But the 1660 treaty failed to de-
fine the exact territorial location of the Spanish-French 
boundary. Only the Treaties of Bayonne in 1866-1868 
formally delimited the political boundary, as France and 
Spain placed border stones along an imaginary line de-
marcating their respective national territories”.73
After 1659: Resistance, On-going Trends 
and Alternatives
Inevitably the process aroused resistance. From 1652 on-
wards people had been fleeing across the border to avoid 
reprisals. While leading groups from the French period, 
including men such as Josep Fontanella and Francesc 
Martí Viladamor, had taken refuge in Perpinyà, others es-
caped to Barcelona. Among these was Gabriel de Llupià, a 
member of the Llupià family whose property was located 
in Rosselló and from which the royal procurators of the 
counties of Rosselló and Cerdanya had always been 
drawn.74 But loyalty to one or other monarchy was not the 
only factor: there was also Catalan identity. In the words 
of the historian Henry: “the inhabitants of Roussillon had 
been Catalans for too many centuries for them not to join 
forces with these peoples”.75 After 1652 the division of 
Catalonia into two parts, one under French military dom-
ination, the other under Hispanic military domination, 
also gave rise to a division between Catalan soldiers 
(known as Miquelets): some were called Miquelets de 
França, others Miquelets d’Espanya, but both were 
Miquelets de la terra (of the homeland). What had oc-
curred was a military division between sovereigns rather 
than a political division between Catalans.
The finances of the part of Catalonia that was subject to 
the Hispanic monarch were ruined. It had preserved its 
institutional framework, however, though the insaculació 
system used in elections to the Generalitat and the Con-
sell de Cent76 was under royal control from 1653-1654 on-
wards. To the king’s men, Barcelona “was at the forefront 
and no permanent or lasting peace ensued. Quite the op-
posite, in fact, for Catalonia endured constant wars. Be-
fore the War of the Spanish Succession, as Soldevila points 
out, “it can be said that, from 1626, when an army was 
posted to Catalonia, until 1697, the date of the Peace of 
Rijswijk, Catalonia constantly suffered the plague of troop 
billeting and levies”. During the wars that broke out in the 
last decades of the 17th century — in 1676, 1678, 1684, 
1688, 1690 and 1691, and during the Nine Years’ War, 
from 1692 to 1697 −, Catalan territory was constantly oc-
cupied by the French army, always in a climate of royal 
mistrust and without any type of Hispanic military de-
fence.69 This situation led the historian Núria Sales to 
consider that the Treaty in fact inaugurated “a mere sev-
en-year truce in over eighty years of almost constant war 
between the Habsburgs in Madrid (or the Habsburg in 
Barcelona, from 1705 to 1713) and the Bourbons in Paris 
(or the Bourbons in Paris and Madrid, from 1700 to 1715). 
It was rather a short truce in comparison to the one that 
followed the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) and 
above all the Treaty of Vervins (1598), and was part of 
over two centuries of rivalry over the inheritance of the 
houses of Burgundy and Foix-Béarne (among others)”.70
Prior the 1679 Treaty of Nimwegen, the French crown 
offered more than once to return the Catalan regions in 
the Eastern Pyrenees to the Hispanic crown in exchange 
for territories in the Low Countries.71 The Spanish rulers, 
blinded by the Habsburgs’ patrimonial tradition, repeat-
edly refused, despite the debilitating effects of maintain-
ing these far-off possessions, already partially in French 
and Dutch hands, which they were destined to lose en-
tirely under the Peace of Utrecht (1713). The idea of an 
exchange was not a new one. For France, keeping the Cat-
alan lands and Germanic Alsatia meant giving up much 
of the Burgundian inheritance and losing a few million 
Walloons, who were culturally French. Mazarin had al-
ready proposed such a solution in Münster (1646). At the 
1656 Madrid talks, he had authorized his secretary Lionne 
to give up all the Catalan territories ceded to France in 
1659 in exchange for the whole of Artois, Luxemburg, and 
Franche-Comté or the part of Navarre under Hispanic 
domination. The trade-off plan was revived in 1668 by 
Jean Hérault de Gourville, the quartermaster of the army 
in Catalonia. Though Gourville had been dragged down 
with the minister Foucquet in his fall, he was entrusted by 
Lionne with the task of opening unofficial peace talks. 
The negotiations had the approval of Louis XIV, who 
even drew the Emperor’s attention to them in Vienna. 
The latter, already aware of the coming clash over the 
Spanish succession, was himself weighing up the advan-
tages of a different exchange with France: the Hispanic 
Low Countries for Alsatia. Louis XIV was not prepared to 
give up Baiona (Bayonne) and Perpinyà at the same time, 
and on 22 January 1671 he sent the following message to 
Emperor Leopold’s Czech minister, Prince von Lobkow-
itz, through his envoy in Vienna, Jacques Brethel de Gré-
monville: “My thoughts regarding the aforesaid exchange 
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Majesty graciously honoured the Catalans and by virtue 
of this agreement ‘all Catalans and other inhabitants of 
the aforesaid province... without exception can return and 
will return, and will effectively be permitted and re-estab-
lished in the possession of all their property, honours, 
dignities, privileges, rights, exemptions, constitutions and 
freedoms…’ ” (“Lo abolir aquesta casa y consistori de la 
Deputació als catalans dels comtats de Rosselló y Conflent 
y terras adjacents que, ab lo tractat de pau v.m. ha concor-
dada ab la corona d’Espanya réstan baix de la sua real 
obediència, ha de resultar en gran deservey de v.m. y 
desconsuelo de sos fidelíssims vassalls... En lo tractat de la 
pau concordat entre v.m. y lo rey Catòlich, cap 55, és estat 
v.m servit honrar los catalans, que en virtut del present 
tracte “tous les catalans et autres habitans de la ditte prov-
ince... sans nul excepter pourront rentrer et reentreront, 
et seront effectivament layssez et restablis en la possession 
de tous leurs biens, honeurs, dignités, privileges, droits, 
exemptions, constitutions et libertés…”).81
But despite everything in June 1660 Louis XIV signed a 
decree in Donibane Lohizune (Saint-Jean-de-Luz) order-
ing the dissolution of the Catalan institutions still in exist-
ence in the territories acquired under the Treaty: the Roy-
al Council, council of the Diputació, tribunal of the 
interior, tribunal of the royal patrimony, and tribunal of 
the court accountant were all abolished in order to ensure 
“the same good order and the same form of justice and 
government as is maintained in the other provinces of our 
kingdom, reducing things as far as possible to the ordi-
nary usage of the latter, and to create for this purpose a 
Sovereign Council of the counties and magistracies of 
Roussillon and Conflent and the adjoining lands” (“le 
mesme bon orde et la mesme forme de justice et de gou-
vernement que se garde dans les autres provinces de nos-
tre royaume, reduisant autant qu’il se pourra les choses à 
l’usage ordinaire de celuy, et de créer pour cette fin un 
Conseil Souverain des comtés et vigueries de Roussillon 
et de Conflent et pays adjounts”).82 From this time on-
wards the government of Northern Catalonia was organ-
ized around the Intendant Général, who was in charge of 
political matters, the Capitaine Général or military gover-
nor, and a Lieutenant Général who was the commander-
in-chief of the army. These positions were mostly held by 
Frenchmen and the military government became a mo-
nopoly of the Noailles family. However certain Catalans, 
as mentioned earlier, also helped to set up the new politi-
cal structures. The lawyer Ramon Trobat i Vinyes, a na-
tive of Rosselló, even became Intendant Général du Rous-
sillon from 1686 to 1698.83 On the other hand, the French 
crown maintained the local administrative structure. 
Thus the post of magistrate of Cerdanya, which was al-
ways held by a member of the Catalan Sicart family,84 re-
tained the corresponding seigneurial jurisdictions regard-
less of the lord’s origin and had to retain the ecclesiastic 
jurisdiction too, though these had never quite coincided 
with the political boundaries. Rosselló, as a province 
réputée étrangère (reputedly foreign province), had two 
of all the Monarchy’s misfortunes” (“la que a hecho cabe-
za a todas las desdichas de la Monarquia”). Not only was 
the city held responsible for the Catalan revolt: it was ac-
cused of giving “a good chance to the Portuguese rebel-
lion” (“buena ocasión a la rebelión de Portugal”) as well, 
and of opening “the appetite of Naples and Palermo to 
unrest and tumult” (“el apetito a las inquietudes y tumul-
tos de Nápoles y Palermo”).77 Barcelona escaped the 
threatened construction of a citadel, but it lost its political 
immunity and was placed under military garrison. 
At least nominally, however, the part of Catalonia un-
der Hispanic domination kept its institutional and consti-
tutional system. The perpetual state of war prevented the 
creation of a new system of government. The Generalitat 
was financially weak, the political power of the Catalan 
institutions (Diputació and Consell de Cent) had been sti-
fled, royal control had been stepped up and the Captaincy 
General reinforced: for the Catholic King’s government 
this was sufficient. 
After the fall of Barcelona in 1652, Mazarin ordered his 
minister Servien to enlist the services of Catalans loyal to 
France who had taken refuge in Rosselló to form a new 
Catalan government. Such outstanding figures of the Cat-
alan revolution as the lawyer Josep Fontanella and above 
all Francesc Segarra from Lleida, and Ramon Trobat, a 
native of Rosselló, entered the service of the King of 
France. While the war was still raging, the Chancery in 
Paris addressed the Catalan political refugees in Perpinyà, 
thanking them for their loyalty, promising them rewards, 
and entrusting them with the government of Rosselló. 
The Comte d’Hocquincourt was appointed Lieutenant, 
Dr Segarra Governor, and the Generalitat, the Royal 
Council and the other tribunals of Catalonia were set up 
in Perpinyà (1654).78 This situation came to an end 1660, 
when the Sovereign Council of Roussillon was created, all 
persons with social status or patrimony were ordered to 
take an oath of allegiance to the King of France (July 
1660), and restrictions were placed on gatherings in Per-
pinyà and the rural regions of Rosselló, Conflent and Cer-
danya (1662).79 Thus no sooner had the Peace of the Pyr-
enees been signed than the Catalan government in 
Rosselló was wound up. 
Catalans in both Barcelona and Rosselló defended the 
integrity of their institutions by appealing to their respec-
tive monarchs on the grounds of Article 55 of the 1659 
Treaty. Barcelona invoked Article 55 in a bid to recover 
the insaculació system, control over the city gates, and the 
baronies confiscated by the king, and to have the garrison 
withdrawn. Perpinyà called for the maintenance of its 
own Generalitat: “Abolishing this house and council of 
the Deputació80 which belong to the Catalans of the coun-
ties of Rosselló and Conflent and neighbouring lands who 
remain under your royal obedience according to the peace 
treaty accepted by Your Majesty with the crown of Spain, 
will cause great disservice to Your Majesty and distress 
to your very faithful vassals... In Chapter 55 of the peace 
treaty between Your Majesty and the Catholic King, Your 
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and fifty-one residents were sentenced to the galleys for 
life. This helped to fan and politicize the revolt against 
the tax and turn it into national resistance.89 Between 
1667 and 1675, under the leadership of Josep de la Trinx-
eria, a member of a family of wool manufacturers and 
notaries from Prats de Molló, the rebellion against the 
salt tax officials and the representatives of the French 
authorities grew.90 Known as the Revolta dels Angelets 
(Revolt of the Little Angels),91 it extended throughout 
Vallespir and reached Conflent, where the rebels were 
commanded by Joan Miquel Mestre, a peasant nick-
named L’Hereu Just (The Just Heir). Francesc Segarra, a 
member of the Sovereign Council of Roussillon, played 
an active part in crushing it. On 5 May 1670 the Lieuten-
ant Général Noël Bouton Chamilly and an army of 4,000 
men defeated the Angelets in Alt Conflent. The victory 
was followed by a severe crackdown, including fines, 
prison and galley sentences, and executions. Many Ange-
lets took refuge south of the Alberes while others went on 
committing sporadic acts of resistance. The movement 
was not unconnected to the wars between France and 
Spain which broke out again in June 1667 when Louis 
XIV demanded the duchy of Brabant as part of the inher-
itance of his wife María Teresa. From 1672 to 1678 the 
Franco-Dutch War dragged on and there is every indica-
tion that the Angelets may have been expecting the Cata-
lan counties to be exchanged for Flanders. But despite 
the repression unleashed by the Sovereign Council, Cata-
lan territory to the north of the Alberes was not pacified. 
“The people of Roussillon calls itself and regards itself as 
Catalan,” reported the Intendant Pont d’Alberet around 
1674, “and would deem the name of Frenchman degrad-
ing and insulting … This spirit even extends into the 
Conseil Superieur. The domination of the French nation 
is endured only because of the impossibility of shaking 
off the yoke” (“Le peuple de Roussillon se nomme et 
s’estime catalan et regarderait comme une degradation et 
une injure le nom de françois … Cet esprit est respandu 
jusque dans le Conseil Superieur … On n’y soufre la na-
tion françoise maître, que pour impossibilité d’en se-
courir le joug”).92 Manuel Descatllar, a noble from Vila-
franca del Conflent who had been under suspicion of 
pro-Hispanic conspiracies since 1670, tried to occupy the 
town with a regiment of soldiers from Puigcerdà in 1674. 
He was assisted by numerous fellow conspirators, both 
nobles and plebeians, including Francesc de Llar, Carles 
de Llar, Carles de Banyuls and the second councillor of 
Vilafranca, Joan Soler.93 They were betrayed, however, 
and the attempt failed. Carles de Banyuls and Francesc 
de Llar fled. Manuel Descatllar, Carles de Llar and Joan 
Soler were accused of lèse-majesté au premier chef (in the 
first degree): their property was confiscated and they 
were severely tortured before being executed. Nor were 
they the only ones. Among the other conspirators from 
Perpinyà who received death sentences were Antoni Riv-
et (a city councillor), Josep Tixedas, Francesc Puig (the 
parish priest of Forques), Manuel Boixó, Pere Dantés (a 
frontiers: one separated it from Languedoc and the other 
was the new Hispano-French frontier. The continuity of 
Catalan social relations based on property, revenues, usu-
fruct, right of way and family ties necessarily required a 
permeable border, “which does not mean,” said the text 
signed in Llívia on 12 November 1660, “that this right of 
passage can serve for committing crimes” (“no entendi-
endo que esta libertad de passaje pueda servir por los deli-
tos que pudieran cometerse”).85
The perpetual wars, the restrictions imposed under the 
1659 Treaty on commercial activities in enemy territory, 
and the Bourbons’ salt tax were to affect Catalan political 
life on both sides of the military frontier. They also 
sparked off outbursts of resistance and led to the emer-
gence of a new political alternative in the war known in 
diplomatic terms as the War of the Spanish Succession. 
Peter Sahlins has investigated the conflicts that arose 
out of the inextricable intertwining of the military fron-
tier with ecclesiastical, fiscal and civil jurisdictions in Cer-
danya and the difficulties and trauma experienced by the 
inhabitants of the valley during the process he calls the 
“territorialization of the State”, in other words, the con-
version of the military frontier into a political frontier.86
The most decisive factor in fixing the political dividing 
line was the criminalization of military desertion and of 
trade across the new frontier. Ministers in the 18th cen-
tury believed it was necessary to rid the kingdom of for-
eign enclaves and to “close the state”, in so far as that was 
territorially possible. “This is no longer a time for con-
quests. France must be satisfied with its greatness and ex-
tension,” wrote the Marquis d’Argenson, Louis XV’s for-
eign minister. “It is time to start governing, after spending 
so much time acquiring what to govern”.87 
The change of sovereign brought with it a change in 
the tax structures of Northern Catalonia. The imposition 
of the salt tax triggered a major episode of anti-tax resist-
ance with nationalistic overtones. Since 1283 the salt 
trade among Catalans had been free of royal taxes. The 
only tax levied — 1.66% of the value of imported salt, 5% 
of the value of salt exported from Catalonia — was paid 
to Catalonia’s own government (the Diputació del Gen-
eral or Generalitat).88 Salt was essential to human life, 
and also to livestock, which was of prime importance in 
the Pyrenean regions. Louis XIV, for military reasons, 
introduced a salt tax in the Catalan lands under his do-
minion in December 1661 and put guards from Langue-
doc in charge of raising it. The guards began to interfere 
in routine purchases of salt from Cardona by the inhabit-
ants of Cerdanya. In effect the decree issued by Louis XIV 
in 1661 criminalized the trade in Catalan salt among the 
people of Cerdanya and turned it into a habitual form of 
contraband. In the spring of 1663 Sant Llorenç de Cer-
dans rose against the managers of the salt tax to cries of 
“Slaughter them! Out with the thieves!” (“A carn, a carn. 
Via fora els lladres”). The Sovereign Council of Roussil-
lon took repressive measures against the village (1665): it 
was fined six thousand livres and the bailiff, councillors 
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ures had been taken against him by the Lieutenant of 
Catalonia, the Duke of Villahermosa. He now retreated 
north of the Alberes with over forty of his followers and 
the leaders of the Barretines became Miquelets de França 
(mountain fusiliers in the service of Louis XIV), just as 
Josep de la Trinxeria, after being forced to flee south of 
the Alberes a few years earlier, had become a Miquelet 
d’Espanya. The leaders of the Barretines acted as agents of 
the Intendant Trobat, who fostered another unsuccessful 
attempt to ally and annex the whole of Catalonia to France 
(1691).97 This attempt apparently had the support of a few 
nobles linked to the Diputació.
In the War of the Spanish Succession, the Catalans, 
spearheading the whole Catalan-Aragonese crown, as-
pired to recover the political ground lost between 1652 
and 1659, to modernize their political structures (both in-
stitutional and legislative) by reinstating their parliamen-
tary system (the Catalan Corts), and to reunite the coun-
try.98 The key political role played by the Tres Comuns 
(Three Commons) made this possible. The Catalan econ-
omy had begun to grow in the second half of the 17th cen-
tury, despite the wars and royal control, and this lent new 
momentum to political life as well. An ad hoc government 
known as the Tres Comuns, comprising representatives 
of the Consell de Cent, the Diputació and the estate made 
up of leading citizens of Barcelona,99 began to launch ini-
tiatives. The scope of the action of the Catalans of Barce-
lona even extended north of the Alberes, where the ac-
tions of the Sovereign Council enable us to detect the 
presence in Rosselló of sectors favourable to the Hague 
Alliance.100 But the Catalan alternative was put down by 
the now very united Franco-Spanish army. 
The examination of the Treaty of the Pyrenees and its 
consequences 350 years after the events is useful in that it 
enables us to grasp the plurinational character of the two 
monarchies and the dynastic-patrimonial nature of their 
frontiers. Diplomacy was merely the peaceful mirror-im-
age of war and was set in motion only when money was 
running out and it became impossible to maintain fiscal 
pressure or military recruitment. The origin of the 
present-day frontiers lies in the military and diplomatic 
action of those monarchies, which took no account of the 
identity of the peoples involved. Historiography, moreo-
ver, has contributed decisively to endowing those dynas-
tic-military frontiers with democratic legitimacy. 
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gran Canciller perpétuo de las Indias, comendador 
mayor del orden de Alcantara, del Consejo de Estado 
del Rey nuestro señor, gentilhombre de su Cámara y 
su cavallerizo Mayor y por el Eminmo señor carde-
nal Julio Mazarini. Madrid, Imprenta de Domingo 
Garcia Morrás, 1660. Editions of the diplomatic 
texts which should also be taken into account in-
clude that of Abreu y Bertodano. Colección de 
los los Tratados de Paz, Vol 7. Madrid 1740-1752, 
pp. 114-246, and the French edition by H. Vast. 
[5] H. Vast. Les Grands Traités, I, p. 89. Vast’s bibliog-
raphy refers to the existence of French, Spanish, 
Latin and German versions of the Treaty, p. 90. 
[6] The spelling of place names in this article reflects 
the existence of two versions of the Treaty, one in 
French and one in Spanish. When the names of 
places in Catalan-speaking lands are referred to in 
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[26] Perpinyà saw itself as “Catalonia’s perpetual ram-
part” (“muralla perpètua de Catalunya”) and its 
“frontier against the French and other enemies (...) 
and the frequent object of attacks by them and of 
numerous wars.” (i “frontera de francesos y de al-
tres enemichs (...) y per aquells sovint infestada y 
molt garrejada”). Eva Serra. “Perpinyà, una vila a 
Corts catalanes (Montsó, 1585)”. Afers, 28 (1997) 
pp. 580 and 587.
[27] Cròniques del Rosselló. Segles XVI-XVII in Antoni 
Simon i Tarrés; Pep Vila (Eds.). Barcelona 1998. 
pp. 100-101 and 103.
[28] The Alberes mountains are the easternmost end of 
the Pyrenees. The part of Catalonia lying to the 
south of them still belongs to Spain, whereas the 
part lying to the north is part of France. 
[29] Under the Treaty the towns of Perpinyà, Argelers, 
Cotlliure, Salses, Tuïr, Vilafranca del Conflent, 
Vinçà and El Voló were deprived of representation 
in the Catalan parliament while Perpinyà and its 
magistracy were excluded from the law governing 
elections to the government of the Generalitat. Eva 
Serra. “Ciutats i viles a Corts Catalanes (1563-
1632): entorn de la força municipal parlamentària”. 
El món urbà a la Corona d’Aragó del 1137 als decrets 
de Nova Planta. XVII Congrés d’Història de la Co-
rona d’Aragó. Barcelona-Lleida, 7-12 de setembre de 
2000. University of Barcelona 2003, Vol. III pp. 
873-900. Eva Serra. “La representació de la Cata- 
lunya Nord a les Institucions Polítiques Catalanes 
abans de l’annexió amb França”. Sessió de la Secció 
Històrico-Arqueològica a Perpinyà (20 d’octubre de 
2004), Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Secció Històrico-
Arqueològica, Barcelona 2005, pp. 13-19.
[30] Josep Sanabre. El tractat..., Barcelona 1960, 
pp. 74-77.
[31] Josep Sanabre. El tractat..., pp. 60, 62.
[32] Joan Reglà. “El tratado...”, pp. 114-117. However, 
in order to get the negotiations underway Luís de 
Haro, according to Joan Reglà, took away docu-
mentation about Conflent, Cerdanya and Rosselló 
which the Viceroy of Catalonia, the Marquis de 
Olías, had taken from the Royal Archives in Barce-
lona along with a copy of the chapters of the Anales 
de la Corona de Aragón by Jerónimo Zurita which 
dealt with these territories. 
[33] Reglà explains that the terms for the restitution of 
these strongholds were modified in the secret trea-
ties relating to the royal marriage. The handover 
was to take place when María Teresa crossed the Bi-
dasoa. Then two French hostages were to enter in 
order to guarantee that the restitution was carried 
out. Reglà. “El tratado...” p. 120. The secret articles 
of the treaty and excerpts from the marriage con-
tract between Louis XIV and María Teresa were 
published by H. Vast. Les Grands..., I, pp. 168-175 
and 176-187. Abreu. Colección... published the 
Louis XIII (1635-1639). Préface de M. Louis Batif-
fol, administrateur de la Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal. 
Éditions Occitania, Paris 1934, p. XII.
[20] C. Vassal-Reig. La guerre..., p. XIV. Article 13 of 
the Treaty of Péronne (18 April 1641) stipulated 
that the counties of Rosselló and Cerdanya could 
not be separated from the Principality of Catalo-
nia. On the ambivalence of French historiography 
with regard to the acquisition of Rosselló in the 
17th century, see: “Per què l’adquisició del Rosse- 
lló és presentada per la historiografia francesa com 
una conquesta militar més?” Revista de Catalunya, 
90 (November 1994), pp. 23-38. The Catalans, in 
their plight, tended to legitimate the alliance with 
France and agreed to be vassals of Louis XIII “as 
their predecessors had formerly done in the times 
of Charlemagne”. Josep Sanabre. La acción de 
Francia en Cataluña. Barcelona 1956, p. 132 (oth-
er references to Charlemagne are on pp. 102, 134 
and 701). C. Vassal-Reig, Richelieu et la Cata-
logne. Paris 1935, p. 188. Charlemagne, in view of 
the situation, was perceived by the Catalans as a 
sovereign who had emerged from the voluntary 
choice of a free people. On the relations between 
Catalonia and France, see also the recent book by 
Oscar Jané Checa. Catalunya i França al segle 
XVII. Identitats, contraidentitats i ideologies a 
l’època moderna (1640-1700). Afers, Catarroja-
Barcelona 2006. 
[21] C. Vassal-Reig. La guerre..., p. XIV.
[22] Peter Sahlins. Boundaries. The making of France 
and Spain in the Pyrenees, University of California 
Press, 1989, pp. 37-38.
[23] From the Catalan point of view these territories 
were: the magistracy of Rosselló and the sub-magis-
tracy of Vallespir, the magistracy of Vilafranca del 
Conflent and the sub-magistracy of Capcir, and the 
magistracy of Puigcerdà. Lluís de Peguera. Practi-
ca, forma y stil de celebrar Corts Generals en Cata-
lunya y materias incidents en aquellas, Gerony 
Margarit, Barcelona. 1632. Facsimile edition, Ed. 
Base, Barcelona 1974, pp. 221-225, 227-234. Peguera 
was a Catalan jurisconsult (1540-1610) and in this 
work he provides a description of Catalonia, listing 
all the country’s towns and villages by magistracies 
and sub-magistracies. 
[24] Peter Sahlins. Boundaries..., p. 65. 
[25] This was highlighted by Catalan historiographical 
research into the wars of the second half of the 17th 
century. See: Ferran Soldevila. Història de Cata- 
lunya, Barcelona 1963, pp. 1060-1095. Joaquim Al-
bareda. Els catalans i Felip V. Barcelona 1993, 
pp. 11-58. Josep Maria Torras. La Guerra de Suc-
cessió i els setges de Barcelona (1697-1714). Barcelo-
na 1999, pp. 27-42. Antonio Espino. Catalunya du-
rante el reinado de Carlos II. Política y guerra en la 
frontera catalana, 1679-1697. Bellaterra 1999.
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[36] Ph. Torreilles. “La délimitation de la frontière 
en 1660”, Revue d’Histoire et d’Archéologie, I (Per-
pinyà, 1900) p. 24. Marca claimed the whole of 
Cerdanya, La Seu d’Urgell and its region and 
the viscountcy of Castellbò, Sanabre. El Tractat..., 
p. 82.
[37] “Arguments relating to counties, magistracies and 
sub-magistracies, arguments taken from authors 
from Ancient Greece and Rome and geographical 
arguments were used by both sides,” writes Núria 
Sales, “except that different ones were selected and 
they were interpreted differently: thus when P. de 
Marca had to give up his Greater Cerdanya, he in-
voked the supposed original limits of the county of 
Rosselló to lay claim to Conflent, while the Spanish 
commissaries showed that Conflent had not formed 
part of it, but rather that the former counts of Cer-
danya had also been counts of Conflent. As for 
Mount Canigó, P. de Marca simply wiped it off the 
map, claiming that there were no mountains be-
tween Rosselló and Conflent except ‘a hill called the 
Col de Terranère’ (‘une colline que l’on appelle le 
col de Terranère’). Sales. “Tractà dels Pirineus...”, 
p. 836, Note 17. 
[38] Article 33 and secret articles appended to the gen-
eral treaty. Reglà. “El Tratado...”, pp. 115 and 120.
[39] The King of France was to receive thirty-three vil-
lages. On 13 August 1660 Serroni wrote to Maz-
arin: “I have already managed to obtain twenty-
eight, which in fact means more than fifty, because 
the word Your Excellency added about villages 
under jurisdiction has enabled me to gain ten, 
though they count only as one, and I have received 
as two some that in fact number four or five” (“je 
me’n suis fait desja accorder vinghuit, qui sont ef-
fectivement plus de cinquante, car le mot que VE 
fait adjouter des villages avec jurisdiction, m’on 
fait gagner dix, que ne sont compter que par un, et 
je n’ay receu que par deux, ceux qui sont en effect 
que quatre ou cinc”), Sanabre. El tractat..., p. 88. 
It was its status as a town under royal jurisdiction 
that made possible the outlandish solution found 
for Llívia.
[40] J. Sanabre. El Tractat..., p. 89.
[41] Eduard Vivas i Llorens. “Panissars històric i 
monumental”. Annals de l’Institut d’Estudis Empor-
danesos, 26 (1993), pp. 35-58.
[42] Ten articles set out the procedure to be followed for 
the normalization of legal affairs on the basis of the 
provisions in Articles 55, 57, 58, 59 and 112 of the 
Treaty. Reglà. “El Tratado...”, pp. 139-146; Sah-
lins. Boundaries..., pp. 54-59.
[43] Núria Sales. “Tractà dels Pirineus...”, p. 830 Note 9.
[44] In this connection Joan Reglà indicates that Ma-
zarin wanted to prevent parliamentary resistance 
such as had been put up by the States of Burgundy 
in 1526. At that time Francis I had taken advantage 
Treaty and the marriage contract, VII, pp. 114-229 
and 324-343. 
[34] Dr Andreu Bosch of Perpinyà dedicated Chapter 29 
of his Títols d’Honor to the topic. It is entitled: “Of 
the five different opinions about what should be 
considered the beginning and promontory of the 
aforementioned Pyrenean mountains in the Medi-
terranean sea in the land of Rosselló and discourse 
in the land of Cerdanya for the purpose of establish-
ing the demarcation between Spain and France and 
part of Narbonnese Gaul” (“De les sinch opinions 
differents ahont se té de pendrer lo principi y prom-
ontori dels dits monts Pyrineus en lo mar Medi- 
terraneo terra de Rosselló y discurs a la terra de Cer-
danya per fer la divisió entre Espanya y França y 
part de la Gal.lia Narbonesa”). Andreu Bosch. Sum-
mari, Índex o Epítome dels admirables y nobilíssims 
títols d’honor de Catalunya, Rosselló y Cerdanya y 
de les gràcies, privilegis, prerrogatives, preheminèn-
cies, llibertats e immunitats gosan segons les pròpies 
y naturals lleys. Pere Lacavalleria estamper, Per-
pinyà 1628, Facsimile edition, Curial, Barcelona-
Sueca 1974, Chapter 29, pp. 117-124. The quotation 
is from page 117. P. Sahlins also explains that Maz-
arin had difficulties comprehending Pyrenean to-
pography and consulted maps with assistance from 
the Catalan doctor in law Ramon Trobat to support 
the claim to Conflent and part of Cerdanya. Many 
of his maps, however, showed mountains where 
there were none. Boundaries..., pp. 54 and 55.
[35] In fact the Marca Hispanica was a posthumous 
work, published in 1688 by the secretary of Pèire de 
Marca, Étienne Baluze, and dedicated to Jean-Bap-
tiste Colbert, the minister of Louis XIV. Baluze took 
up Marca’s ongoing project and completed it. His 
preface to the reader contains an account of the 
Ceret negotiations from the viewpoint of the French 
commissaries. With respect to the Marca Hispani-
ca, see Tomàs de Montagut [Bibliography]. Anu-
ario de Historia del Derecho Español. Vol. LXX 
(2000), pp. 626-630, and Jesús Villanueva. “La 
Marca Hispanica de Pierre de Marca y Étienne Bal-
uze a través de sus tres momentos de composición 
(1648-1650, 1660, 1688): de «ilustración» huma-
nista a colección documental”. Pedralbes, 24 (2004) 
p. 205-231. Núria Sales, commenting on the book by 
Blandine Barret-Kriegel. Les historiens et la mo- 
narchie (1988), explained the complex way in which 
interests of State intertwined with the patronage of 
scholars and monasteries in the 17th and 18th cen-
tury. She writes: “in 1683 Colbert showed the need 
to commission knowledgeable people to produce 
vast compilations of ‘provincial’ history”. It seems 
likely that the Marca Hispanica was part of this plan 
of Colbert’s. Núria Sales. “Dom Mabillon, dom 
Lobineau” i el P. Villanueva una No-història?”. 
Afers, 10 (1990), pp. 521-532. 
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[61] Articles 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59. The Treaty tries to 
establish patterns for solving the complex casuistry 
of the restitutions with regard to matters such as 
loans, property under dispute, lluïsmes (laudesima, 
a type of property transfer tax), pro-rata agreements 
and advance payments, and to regulate as far as 
possible the return of confiscated property, etc. The 
talks in Figueres laid down the rules to be followed 
in these matters in the case of Catalonia. Articles 
28-31 also refer to civil restitutions in various geo-
graphical areas. In Article 32 both monarchs agree 
to uphold ecclesiastical appointments made during 
the war. 
[62] Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 25, 26 and 27. Merchants and 
subjects who travel are entitled to a lawyer and can 
keep their accounts in “whatever language they 
want, Spanish, French, Flemish and others, and 
may not be importuned or investigated for this rea-
son” (“la lengua que quisieran, en español, francés, 
flamenca o otras sin que por esto puedan ser moles-
tados e inquiridos” ) (Article 25).
[63] Article 10.
[64] Articles 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.
[65] Article 24.
[66] Articles 1,2, 3 and 4. Article 4 called for “All causes 
of enmity or disagreement [to] be wiped out and 
extinguished for ever and everything that has been 
said or has occurred as a result of the present war or 
during the time of the war [to] be relegated to per-
petual oblivion”. (“ Todos los motivos de enemistad 
o mala inteligencia quedaran borrados y extingui-
dos para siempre y todo lo que se ha dicho y passa-
do por razón de la presente guerra u en el tiempo 
della se pondran en perpètuo olvido”).
[67] Sanabre. El Tractat..., p. 79.
[68] For the quotations from Parets, see Antoni Simon i 
Tarrés. “L’estatus de Barcelona després de la pau 
dels Pirineus, presidi o ciutadella?”. Estudis, 32 
(2006), pp. 240 and 241.
[69] Ferran Soldevila. Història de Catalunya. Barcelo-
na 1963, pp. 1090-1095; Sales. Història de Ca- 
talunya. Els segles de la decadència. Segles XVI-XVI-
II. Barcelona 1989, p. 396; Albareda. Els catalans..., 
pp. 36-50; Espino. Cataluña durante..., Chapters 1, 
2 and 3. As Soldevila says, on the eve of the War of 
the Spanish Succession, “political intrigues mingled 
with the war, while the defence of Catalonia was 
subordinated to the interests of the pro-French par-
ty, which was rapidly gaining supporters at Court”, 
p. 1091. 
[70] Núria Sales. “Tractà dels Pirineus...”, p. 830, Note 9.
[71] Pau de la Fàbrega Pallarès. L’oferiment de retro-
cessió del Rosselló a Espanya (1668-1677), Barcelona 
1994. On this point H. Vast says that between 1643 
and 1650 “Mazarin would have liked to facilitate 
France’s acquisition of all the conquests made in 
the Low Countries and Franche-Comté, in ex-
of the situation by refusing to relinquish Burgundy 
on the grounds that the States of Burgundy were 
withholding recognition of the 1526 Treaty of Ma-
drid, which had been drawn up without consulting 
them. For the rest of the 17th century the Catalan 
government (Diputació del General or Generalitat) 
went on considering the magistracies of Rosselló, 
Conflent and part of Cerdanya as its own territory 
for electoral purposes (insaculació) and its admin-
istrative documents never acknowledge the renun-
ciation of Northern Catalan territory. The meeting 
of the Catalan parliament (Corts de Barcelona) 
convened in 1705-1706 by Archduke Charles III al-
luded to it frequently. Several Catalan claims to the 
same effect were made, such as the anonymous 
booklet published in 1734, Via fora els adormits, 
mentioned by Ferran Soldevila in his Història de 
Catalunya. Barcelona 1963, p. 1067. 
[45] Articles 34-40 and 61.
[46] Article 61. Articles concerning the restitution of ter-
ritory to the Catholic King: 44 (county of Charolais 
but under the sovereignty of the King of France), 46 
(Ieper/Ypres), 47 (Valenza on the Po and Mortara), 
48 (county of Burgundy). Articles concerning the 
conditions governing evacuations: leaving without 
causing damage (50); artillery and other military 
equipment can be removed (51); debts to the inhab-
itants must be paid prior to departure (52); the Most 
Christian King pardons the Hesdin garrison (53); all 
types of documents and title deeds attesting owner-




[50] Articles 62-78 and 121 relate to the Duke of Lor-
raine.
[51] Articles 45, 79-87 and 117.
[52] Article 88.
[53] Articles 21, 22, 89, 90, 108 and 109.
[54] Articles 91-100.
[55] Article 101.
[56] Swiss cantons, Article 102; Grisons, Article 103; 
Monaco, Article 104; Duchesse de Chevreuse, Arti-
cle 105.
[57] Articles 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 and 
120. Articles 49, 116 and 118 refer, as mentioned 
earlier, to the Catalan strongholds of Roses, Fort de 
la Trinitat and Cadaqués.
[58] On prisoners of war, Articles 106, 107 and 111.
[59] Article 124. Vast indicates that the Treaty was regis-
tered on 21 July 1660 in the Parliament in Paris and 
in the course of the year in various provincial parlia-
ments, but says that “on the other hand, the court in 
Madrid seems to consider Article 124 as void”. The 
Treaty was registered neither in Castile nor in the 
Low Countries. Vast. Les Grands..., I, p. 166. 
[60] Final considerations of the Treaty.
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[84] Sahlins. Boundaries..., p. 56.
[85] Sanabre. El Tractat..., p. 90.
[86] Sahlins. Boundaries..., Chapter 2, pp. 61-102. On 
the continuation of trans-Pyrenean trade, see Pa-
trice Poujade. Une société marchande. Le com-
merce et ses acteurs dans les Pyrénées modernes. 
Tempus, PUM, 2008. 
[87] Sahlins. Boundaries..., pp. 95-96. The English 
translation of the words of the Marquis d’Argenson 
is also taken from Sahlins. 
[88] Eva Serra i Puig. “Tarifs douaniers dans la Ca- 
talogne Moderne” in Gilbert Larguier (Ed.). Doua- 
nes. États et Frontières dans l’Est des Pyrénées de 
l’Antiquité à nos jours. PUP-AHAD, Perpinyà 2005, 
pp. 61-88, especially p. 81.
[89] La guerra de la sal, R. Megerand and R. Sala 
(Eds.), Perpinyà 1985. 
[90] Alice Marcet. “Une révolte anti-fiscale et nationale: 
les Angelets du Vallespir (1663-1672)”. Actes du 102e 
Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes. Limoges 
1977, Section d’histoire, Bibliothèque Nationale, 
Paris 1978, Vol. I, p. 35-48. Alain Ayats. Les guerres 
de Josep de la Trinxeria (1637-1694). La guerre du sel 
et les autres. El Trabucaire, Perpinyà 1997. 
[91] The nickname may have arisen out of the speed at 
which the rebels were able to appear and disappear, 
owing to their familiarity with the mountains and 
the form of guerrilla warfare they employed, or it 
may be a reference to Saint Michael, the patron of 
the wool manufacturers of Prats de Molló. 
[92] Sanabre. Resistència..., p. 112.
[93] Sanabre. Resistència, pp. 113-114. Descatllar had 
the support of important families of Vilafranca del 
Conflent such as the Llar, Soler, Miquel and Prats 
families. “On seeing that the principality had rid it-
self of those who were now considered only as op-
pressors,” writes Henry, “they too sought to escape 
from them, and appealed to their compatriots for 
assistance”. Histoire..., II, p. 417. 
[94] Albert Garcia Espuche. Barcelona entre dues 
guerres. Economia i vida quotidiana (1652-1714). 
Vic 2005, pp. 147-198. 
[95] The name refers to the traditional headgear of Cat-
alan peasants and sailors.
[96] Joaquim Albareda. Els catalans..., pp. 31-50. 
Jaume Dantí. Aixecaments populars als Països Cat-
alans (1687-1693). Barcelona 1990, pp. 119-158.
[97] J. Albareda. Els catalans..., p. 35.
[98] The Catalan laws (constitucions) approved at 
meetings of parliament (the Catalan Corts) held 
during the reign of Archduke Charles III (1705-
1706) often refer to the “our towns in the Present 
Principality of Catalonia and the Counties of Ro s- 
selló and Cerdanya” (“viles nostres del Present 
Principat de Catalunya i Comtats de Rosselló i Cer-
danya”).
[99] Eduard Martí. “La Conferència dels Comuns. Una 
change for Catalonia and Roussillon”, Les Grands..., 
p. 80.
[72] Pau de la Fàbrega. L’oferiment..., pp. 30 and 38-39. 
In the letter Louis XIV also expressed his willing-
ness to offer assistance to the Hispanic king in the 
form of troops, ships and money “for the conquest 
of Africa, which is so close to his Crown and which 
is so necessary to him for trade and for the security 
and defence of his maritime strongholds”.
[73] Sahlins. Boundaries..., p. XV.
[74] J. Sanabre. Resistència..., p. 73. Pere Gifre. 
“Família i patrimoni a l’època moderna, segles XVI-
XVIII” and Miquel Pérez Latre. “Els Llupià i la 
política a l’edat moderna”. Història dels Llupià 
(1088-1771) i dels llinatges incorporats: Icard, Roger 
i Vallseca. Edicions Trabucaire, Canet 2006, pp. 85-129 
and 141-184.
[75] “[and] not to share their dislike of the French” 
D.M.J. Henry. Histoire du Roussillon. Paris 1835, 
II, p. 417. On factors of identity in Rosselló: Oscar 
Jané. Catalunya i França al segle XVII.... 
[76] The Consell de Cent (Council of One Hundred) is 
the name given to the Barcelona municipal council. 
The Generalitat (cf. Note 14) is the Catalan govern-
ment. The system of insaculació (also known as sac 
i sort) consisted of making appointments to public 
office by drawing lots. 
[77] Josep Maria Torras i Ribé. “El projecte de repres-
sió dels catalans de 1652”. La revolució catalana de 
1640, Barcelona 1991, p. 251. On the criminaliza-
tion of Barcelona, see Fernando Sánchez Marcos. 
“El nuevo ‘status’ de Barcelona tras su reincorpo-
ración a la monarquía hispánica en 1652”. Home-
naje al Dr D. Juan Reglà Campistol. Valencia 1975, 
Vol I, pp. 597-609. Antoni Simon. “L’estatus de 
Barcelona...” and Antoni Simon. Ecos catalans i his-
pànics de la caiguda de Barcelona el 1652. Institut 
d’Estudis Catalans, Barcelona 2007.
[78] Sanabre. El tractat..., p. 91 and J. Sanabre. Re-
sistència del Rosselló a incorporar-se a França, Bar-
celona, 1970, pp. 70-71.
[79] Sanabre. Resistència..., pp. 94, 96.
[80] Deputació is a variant spelling of Diputació (see 
Note 14).
[81] Josep Sanabre. El Tractat..., p. 91.
[82] J. Sanabre. La acción de Francia..., p. 596 and 
Sanabre. Resistència. pp. 91-92. Also G. Clerc. 
Recherches sur le Conseil Souverain de Roussillon, 
1660-1790: organisation et compétences. 2 Vols. Law 
thesis. University of Toulouse, 1973. Moreover an 
edict issued in February made it compulsory for 
notarial deeds, public documents, proceedings and 
verdicts to be drawn up in French. Raymond Sala. 
Dieu, le roi, les hommes. Perpignan et le Roussillon 
(1580-1830). Perpinyà 1996, p. 218.
[83] Anette Smedley-Weill. Les intendants de Louis 
XIV. Fayard, 1995, p. 60.
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institució per a la defensa de les institucions a Ca- 
talunya (1698-1714)”. J. Sobrequés (coor.). Actes 
del 53 Congrés de la Comissió Internacional per a 
l’Estudi de la Història de les Institucions Represen- 
tatives i Parlamentàries, Vol. I. Parlament de Cata- 
lunya, Museu d’Història de Catalunya, Barcelona 
2005, pp. 447-466. Also Ibidem, La Conferència dels 
Tres Comuns, Treball d’iniciació a la recerca. Insti-
tut Universitari Jaume Vicenç-Vives-Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, September 2005.
[100] Mònica Ferrer. “El suport a l’arxiduc en els com- 
tats del Rosselló i la Cerdanya durant els primers 
anys de la guerra”. L’Avenç, 206 (September 1996), 
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